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Chapter Five 
Patterns of Net Borrowing in Open Developing Economies 
 
 This short and final empirical chapter looks at net lending flows – incomes 
minus expenditures – over time for the government, private, and rest of the world 
“institutional sectors”, normalized in all cases by GDP. Long debates and many 
policy recommendations have followed from the interpretation of how net lending 
by different sectors relate to each other. We therefore review the conceptual 
debate first. This also serves as an introduction to the short-term macroeconomic 
analysis of Chapter 7. 
As an accounting identity, of course, total net borrowings must sum to 
zero: 
(Private investment-Savings) + (Public spending-Taxes) + (Exports-Imports) = 0, 
with a positive entry indicating that a sector is a net contributor to effective 
demand. An alternative way to present this identity is by expressing it in terms of 
deficits (with a positive magnitude indicating that there is a deficit and, therefore, 
a net borrowing requirement), with the external deficit (negative current account 
balance) placed at the right hand side of the identity: 
Private Sector Deficit + Fiscal Deficit = External Deficit 
Since the external deficit has to be financed, this identity can also be expressed 
as: 
Private Sector Deficit + Fiscal Deficit = Net External Financing 
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A favorite topic in the macroeconomic literature has been to identify 
possible “twins”, that is parallel movements of the external deficit and domestic 
deficits on left hand side of the equation, as well as opposite movements of 
private and fiscal deficits (“crowding out”), to guarantee that overall net 
borrowings add up to zero.  
In the orthodox literature on developing countries, the most commonly 
emphasized “twins” are the co-movements of fiscal and current account deficits. 
As we will see, this phenomenon has occurred sporadically at most, indicating 
that the widely accepted “twin deficits” view of macro adjustment does not seem 
to apply.  
An alternative “twin”, private/foreign, is actually more common, implying 
that current account deficits largely reflect pro-cyclical swings in private spending 
which are financed by borrowing from the rest of the world. These twin 
private/external deficits are, of course, common during booms, when there is 
easy access to foreign capital, but are reduced or turned into surpluses during 
crises, when external financing dries out. This pattern indicates, furthermore, that 
there is no “consumption-smoothing” behavior – an important feature of 
mainstream “Ricardian equivalence” analysis. 
Whereas the most commonly emphasized “twins” do not seem to provide 
a good description of how developing economies perform, macroeconomic 
flexibility may be crucial. Particularly, it is important that the macroeconomy be 
able to absorb strong fluctuations in external financing and associated private 
deficits/surpluses. Such fluctuations did not derail growth in the Tigers and 
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Southeast Asia in the 1980s. In turn, China, India, and some Tigers continued to 
grow through the turbulent late 1990s. But other countries and regions have been 
unable to manage such swings in capital flows. These ideas are developed 
further in Chapter 7. 
 
Traditional Interpretations 
There are at least four incompatible contemporary doctrines regarding 
how open macro-economies operate. As indicated above, twin fiscal/external 
deficits (TD) and Ricardian equivalence (RE) dogmata are widely spread in 
mainstream literature. In contrast, development and heterodox economists often 
favor structural gap (SG) and unstable external financing (UEF) explanations of 
macroeconomic balances in developing countries.  
In development macroeconomics, the twin deficits hypothesis traces back 
at least to the IMF economist Jacques Polak’s (1957) blueprint for the “financial 
programming” exercises, which to this day are the linchpin of the International 
Monetary Fund’s stabilization packages. The recipe for action is to cut the fiscal 
deficit, which is supposed to improve the economy’s external position. Polak was 
drawing on a long tradition of monetarist analysis of the balance of payments. In 
one variant, unless the private sector chooses to increase its saving – or, more 
precisely, reduce its net borrowing — a higher fiscal deficit must be paid for by 
domestic money creation.1 Aggregate demand consequently goes up. Under 
tacit assumptions that all resources are fully employed and the domestic price 
                                                 
1 In terms of Chapter 6, this assumption means that the IMF simply disregards 
the role  of a domestic market for government bonds. 
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level is tied to foreign prices by arbitrage in foreign trade (purchasing power 











fiscal shifts while private and government borrowing dance the trade-offs. 
                                                
Ricardian equivalence (Barro, 1974) emerges from dynamic optima
savings models postulating that all resources are fully employed and that 
households smooth their consumption (or, more generally, expenditure including 
residential investment) over time. It plays a far more central role in contemporary
mainstream macroeconomics than Polak’s somewhat dated monetarism. Along 
the lines of Say’s Law, RE broadly asserts that a change in fiscal net borrowing
will be offset by an equal shift in private net lending. In this context, traditional 
counter-cyclical fiscal policy cannot play any role, as it would be counterbalanced
by an opposing response from the private sector. For example, as fiscal defici
increase, the private sector saves more in anticipation of the taxes that it will 
have to pay in the future to pay for the additional public sector debt. In an open 
economy context, any one country’s external position will then be determined by
inter-temporal trade-offs between consumption and saving with all c
the world producing the same good (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1997).2  
 TD and RE stories are not compatible because they assign different roles 
to private net borrowing and net external financing. Under TD, private borrowing 
is “neutral” in that it does not respond to shifts in the external or fiscal positions.
Under RE, the current account (net external financing) is neutral with regar
 
2 In this view the bilateral trade deficit of the US with China would be “explained” 
by a higher rate of time preference in the former.  
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 It must be emphasized that, even if the negative correlations predicted by 
the TD and RE frameworks hold, their assumptions about macroeconomic 
causality may not be valid. Causality can be interpreted as running the other way 
– from the external to the fiscal and/or private sector financial gap, or from private 
to public, respectively. Particularly, if, as discussed in Chapter 1, the economy is 
externally constrained, the external position may be “structural”, according to a 
SG framework, and will therefore persist in the face of plausible domestic policy 
changes. This means that, within “reasonable” ranges of real exchange rate 
values and the level of economic activity, the trade deficit – or surplus, say for 
China or Japan – will not change by very much. The economy can also be 
externally constrained during periods of scarce external financing, as the UEF 
hypothesis would predict, generating the same type of problems during cyclical 
downswings. 
Similarly, causality may run counter to the assumptions of the RE 
hypothesis. In traditional Keynesian analysis, for example, swings in private 
deficits run the show, either through autonomous variations of investment 
(“animal spirits”) or in the propensity to consume. Counter-cyclical fiscal policy is 
called for to compensate the swings in the associated private sector balances. If 
private spending is weak, generating low investment or consumption (high 
private net lending), a fiscal deficit comes forth to absorb the private surplus (and 
a fiscal surplus if private net borrowing is exuberant). If high private lending is not 
offset by fiscal borrowing, a recession would ensue, reducing tax revenues that 
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would generate a fiscal deficit anyway. These reactions reproduce the offsetting 
private and fiscal deficits of the RE story, but with reverse causality. 
 
Structuralist Interpretations 
SG analysis resembles full employment RE in that a binding external gap 
imposes a supply constraint on the system. Particularly, in a developing country 
context, the question becomes: how does effective demand adjust to meet the 
supply constraints imposed by available imports? To hold demand stable, any 
shift in the private or public sector net borrowing position has to be reflected into 
an offsetting change in the other domestic gap. So, if fiscal policy is targeted to 
expand economic activity by increasing public sector spending, it would generate 
inflationary pressures. Inflation tax and forced saving mechanisms would then 
kick in, reducing real demand by the private sector –that is, a private sector 
surplus is forcefully generated to finance the fiscal deficit (Taylor, 2004). The 
process can also work in reverse. If we focus on variations in external financing, 
and private net borrowing is assumed to be neutral, then fiscal deficits will be 
determined by shifts in the external gap: TD with causality reversed. 
This dynamic behavior has been highlighted in the UEF literature, 
although it focuses on domestic private rather than (or at least as much as) on 
fiscal balances (see, for example, Stiglitz et al, 2006, Part III; Ffrench-Davis, 
2006, 2008; Ocampo, 2008). This literature emphasizes the fact that private 
capital flows to the developing world – more to the middle-income or “emerging 
economies” than to the poorest ones — are unstable. Three strong financing 
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cycles have been experienced since the 1970s: abundance in the second half of 
the 1970s, largely due to the recycling of oil surpluses, followed by extreme 
scarcity during the “lost decade” of the 1980s; abundance again beginning in the 
early 1990s, followed by renewed scarcity in the aftermath of the Asian and 
Russian crises of 1997 and 1998 respectively; and abundance again since 2004, 
followed by more moderate flows after the US sub-prime crisis of mid-2007 and a 
freeze in financing following the world financial meltdown of September 2008. 
Domestic balances adjust to the availability of external financing, along 
similar lines to those emphasized in the SG literature. In the 1970s, many 
governments borrowed heavily, so fiscal deficits were the counterpart of 
abundant external financing. The pattern was a twin fiscal/external deficit, but 
with the causality reversed in relation to the Polak framework. For countries of 
the Southern Cone of Latin America, private rather than fiscal deficits were then 
the counterpart (or twin) of the “exuberance” in external financing. Both sorts of 
responses were led by liberalization of the domestic financial sector and the 
capital account, and eventually led to massive private bankruptcies and domestic 
financial crises (and associated public sector rescues) when capital stopped 
flowing in. Later on, crises driven from abroad became the pattern in the 
developing world. Referring to the Mexican “Tequila” crisis of 1994, IMF 
Managing Director Michel Camdessus called the associated meltdown “the first 
crisis of the twentieth-first century”. However, events of this type had been 
inaugurated in modern times by the Southern Cone countries (particularly Chile) 
in the early 1980s, and there were many precedents further in the past (recall the 
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1930s, for example). All these crises were not so much a “twenty-first” century 
pattern of fast reaction from the financial markets but rather a consequence of 
structural features of economies subject to strong cyclical swings in external 
financing. 
 
What Does the Data Say?  
It becomes interesting to see what patterns emerge from the data. Table 
5.1 presents partial correlation coefficients among the three possible pairs of 
balances. The strongest message that emerges is that the private/external twin is 
much more common (nine out of the twelve regions) than the traditional Polak 
public/external twin. Only five regions show the statistically significant negative 
coefficient predicted by the TD story, but in three of them the alternative twin 
seems more powerful; in a fourth one, North Africa and the Middle East, the 
coefficient, although significant, is rather small. This makes the TD hypothesis of 
limited empirical relevance. Indeed, only the former USSR shows a dominant 
Polak twin, with causality subject to debate (see below). The centrality of shifts in 
external financing indicates that this variable is far from “neutral”, and thus the 














    Tigers 1981-2006     -0.48*    -0.96**             0.21 
    Southeast Asia 1979-2006    0.25    -0.92**  -0.61** 
    China 1982-2006     0.47*    -0.96**  -0.71** 
    South Asia 1979-2006    -0.47*    -0.78**            -0.19 
    Semi-Industrialized countries 1980-2006   -0.07    -0.73**  -0.63** 
    Andean  1977-2006    0.09    -0.76**  -0.72** 
    Central America and the 
Caribbean 1977-2006     -0.54**    -0.69**            -0.24 
    Central and Eastern Europe 1990-2006  -0.12    -0.79** -0.51* 
    Russia and Ukraine 1995-2006    -0.74**  -0.45            -0.26 
    Representative Africa 1980-2006 -0.20  -0.32   -0.87** 
    Other Africa 1980-2005 -0.26    -0.73**  -0.46* 
    Middle East and Northern 
Africa 1981-2006  -0.45* -0.32   -0.70** 
Table 5.1: Correlation Coefficients for Institutional Sectors Net Borrowing Flows 
*   Correlation is significant at 5% 
** Correlation is significant at 1% 
Source: United Nations Common Database. 
 
The dominance of the private/external twin is evident in the three cases 
that are shown in detail in Figure 5.1. In the Tigers, the fiscal role was rather 
passive. The private and foreign co-movements were very large, with swings up 
and down exceeding 10% of GDP (Figure 5.1a). Maintaining very high per capita 
income growth over a 25-year period with the macro economy subject to such 
extreme fluctuations is a feat perhaps unprecedented historically. However, 
some of them stumbled during the Asian crisis, indicating that even the best 
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Figure 5.1c 
Figure 5.1: Resource gaps by institutional sectors in Tigers, Southeast Asia and semi-
industrialized Latin America. 
Source: Source: United Nations Common Database. 
 
In five out of the nine cases there was a mix between a dominant 
private/external twin and offsetting movements between private and fiscal 
deficits. In two cases, South-East Asia and China, these domestic movements 
clearly reflect counter-cyclical fiscal policy. As the swings in external financing led 
to parallel movements in private sector balances, public sector finances tried to 
compensate, a fact that is reflected in the positive correlation between the fiscal 
balance and external financing. Figure 5.1b illustrates the case of South-East 
Asia. In this case, again, the very strong private/external swing is accompanied 
by counter-cyclical movements of fiscal balances: deficits during the 1980s 
followed by small surpluses during the booming 1990-97 period and deficits 
again during the Asian crisis, gradually corrected thereafter.  
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The semi-industrialized countries show a case in which a dominant 
private/external twin is mixed with a negative correlation between private and 
fiscal deficits but there are no signs of counter-cyclical fiscal policy (the other two 
cases are the small Andean countries and other Africa). Except for the 
recessionary “lost decade” of the 1980s, this region appears to have a more or 
less structural external deficit. The wide offsetting swings in net government and 
private borrowing are associated with the “lost decade”, with the interpretation 
following SG or UEF lines, as the dominant constraint was clearly foreign 
exchange availability. Despite IMF programs, public sectors faced difficulties 
balancing the budget. Given foreign exchange constraints, the inflation tax and 
forced savings kicked in to generate the private sector surplus necessary to 
“finance” the budget deficit. 
As indicated, there are only three regions for which the private/external 
twin is not dominant. One of them, the former USSR, is the only case in which 
the Polak twin dominates although, given the relatively short period for which the 
analysis was run, its empirical relevance remains dubious. The causality also 
seems to be the opposite to that assumed by the TD literature, as the 
improvement in the fiscal balance which underlies the story seems to be 
associated first with the strong fiscal adjustments that was forced upon Russia by 
the 1998 crisis, followed in the mid-2000s by the strong fiscal effects of booming 
oil revenues (Figure 5.2a). 
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Figure 5.2b  




Source: United Nations Common Database. 
 
Finally, Figure 5.2b shows the history of one of the two regions where a 
strong offsetting behavior of domestic balances was not associated with any 
externally-dominant twin, Representative Africa (the other is the Middle East and 
Northern Africa). The story seems again dominated by events during the “lost 
decade”, and thus by foreign exchange scarcity. Indeed, starting in the 1990s, 
this region looks much more like one dominated by a private/external twin with 
fiscal policy playing a rather passive role.  
  
